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LAWYERS MEET THE LAW:
CRITICAL U.S. VOICES OF HELMS-BURTON*
JOAQUfN RoY**
University of Miami
* This article should recognize, above all, the generous and unconditional
encouragement received from my colleague and friend Enrique Baloyra in what
was probably his last editing activity before his untimely death in July of 1997. As
an unsolicited response to a simple query for informal comments on a tentative
version of an initial draft paper, he decided to put it through the customary review
process. This decision led to the eventual publication in the form of an article
entitled The Helms-Burton Law: Development, Consequences, and Legacy for
Inter-American and U.S.-European Relations in the Journal of Inter-American
Studies and WorldAffairs. It was preceded in Spanish by a brief article entitled
Origen, desarrollo y consecuencias de la ley Helms-Burton, published in the
Anuario Iberoamericano and compacted in a short essay titled Augey caida de la
ley Helms-Burton, published in Leviatdn, Archivos del Presente, and Encuentro.
Among the colleagues, officials, and assistants who have contributed according to
their generosity and special capacities are Ambler H. Moss, Angel Vifias, Robert
Kirsner, Anna Krit and Eleanor Lahn. The staff of the following libraries and
institutions should receive proper credit for facilitating the use of difficult-to-find
sources: the Richter Library and the Law School Library of the University of
Miami, the Law School Library of the University of Barcelona, the CIDOB
Foundation of Barcelona, the Instituto de Relaciones Europeo-Latinoamericanas
(IRELA), and DGI and DGVIII of the European Commission.
** Joaquin Roy is professor of international studies and director of the
European Studies/Iberian Studies Research Institute at the University of Miami
Graduate School of International Studies. He was born in Barcelona, Spain in
1943. Professor Roy holds a law degree from the University of Barcelona and a
Master's and Ph. D. from Georgetown University. He is the author or editor of 19
books and over 100 scholarly articles and reviews. Among his recent books are
Cuba andSpain: Relations andPerceptions, Latin American Christian Democratic
Thought, The Reconstruction of Central America: the Role of the European
Community, and The ibero-American Space.
YEARBOOK OF INTER NATIONAL LAW [Vol. 6
I. INTRODUCTION




III. ON PROPERTY AND CITIZENSHIP
A. Trafficking in Stolen Property
B. Citizenship: A Widened Concept
C. Facing a U-Turn: The Estoppel
IV. ON CODES AND STATES
A. Tampering with the Constitution
B. Codifying the Embargo
C. Detecting the Real Purpose of Helms-Burton
D. A Thorny Issue: Extraterritoriality
E. Agreements & Conventions: The Violation of
International Law
Lawyers Meet The Law
V. A PRICE To PAY: CONSEQUENCES
A. The Political Cost




When the United States Senate and House of Representatives
inserted a number of adjustments into the basic text of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (hereinafter the
"Helms-Burton Act") in late 1996, it caused some major
developments and consequences. These events and fallouts are
complex as they have affected dozens of states and international
organizations, concerned hundreds of companies in many nations,
risen the hopes of thousands of Cuban-Americans, generated multiple
political protagonists, consumed substantial column space in
newspapers and weeklies in three continents, and engaged the
energies of literally hundreds of government officers and scholars. It
is still early to evaluate the true profile of the legacy of the law and
its impact on U.S. international relations and domestic politics.
Some of the events are well-known to the public, while others
exist only in boardrooms or in the pages of academic journals.
Nevertheless, all have a common origin: the Cuban Revolution and
the confrontation with the United States. This latest chapter of the
U.S.-Cuba friction has some unique features. These features are the
indirect object of this article. However, a tentative balance is in
order. First, let us consider the basic pivotal events.
The first event is the criminal shooting of two Cuban exile
planes a few miles off the coast of Havana, Cuba on February 24,
1996. This event shattered all possibilities ofrapprochement between
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the U.S. and Cuba. Second was President Bill Clinton's apparent
compulsion to sign the Helms-Burton bill on March 12, 1996. Third,
as an example of the world's displeasure with the law, the European
Union (hereinafter "EU") decided, in the fall of 1996, to enact a
Regulation (complemented by a Joint Action) as a blocking measure
against the U.S. move, while announcing its intent of placing this
issue in the framework of the World Trade Organization (hereinafter
"WTO"). As a confirmation of its standing policy of conditioning
cooperation aid packages, the EU also issued a Common Position
detailing the requirements to be met by Cuba in order to become a
beneficiary of a cooperation aid agreement.
Fourth, on April 11, 1997, as a sign of mutual concern for the
looming confrontation between close economic and political partners,
the EU responded to the partial suspension of the law and the
promises to extend its neutralization by entering into a pact
(confirmed by a May 1998 Understanding) with the United States that
would in essence freeze the impact of the Helms-Burton Act. Finally,
the death of Cuban exile Jorge Mas Canosa, a major force behind the
Helms-Burton Act, onNovember 23, 1997, generated many questions
about the overall U.S.-Cuba relations, and the future of many of the
projects and enterprises which he helped to develop. Among these
projects are the Cuban-American National Foundation, Radio and TV
Marti, and a financial lobby in Washington.
The Cuban political transition, a final decisive development,
will be the closing chapter of the recent stormy relationship between
the U.S. and Cuba. Whether this is done with or without the presence
of Fidel Castro is irrelevant for this analysis. The scope of this essay
is limited to some of the legal aspects (especially domestic) of the
Helms-Burton Act while Cuba is still ruled according to a dictatorial,
Marxist-Leninist regime, moderately alleviated by a series of
openings in the economic policies.
With the law partially neutered by President Clinton through
subsequent suspensions of its thorny part, in addition to a truce
compromise signed with the European Union, a serious international
[Vol. 6
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confrontation has been defused. However, the legacy of the law is
composed of the consequences of its simple enactment. At least
several by-products can be considered. First, there is the impressive
unanimity shared by the U.S. commercial partners and political allies
in opposing the measure. The law has given mainly Canada, Mexico,
and the member states of the European Union (in unison or
separately) a unique opportunity to show an autonomy from the
overwhelming presence of the only superpower. At the same time, the
Helms-Burton Act has prompted some foreign actors to confirm and
mildly reshape their relations toward Cuba. While opposing the
Helms-Burton Act, the rest of the world has shown signs of inducing
Cuba to reform and respect human rights. In some countries, which
have "special" relations with Cuba, the law and its controversies have
served to rekindle internal confrontations. Second, the Helms-Burton
Act has given Cuba an additional life-saving mechanism to blame the
increasingly negative economic situation of the U.S. embargo.
Third, although the law has proven to be ineffective politically
and economically, in the domestic arena it has served to strengthen
the electoral power of its main backers. The Helms-Burton Act has
supplied the core of the Cuban exile community with a guarantee that
the policy toward Cuba will remain the same by virtue of the
codification of the requirements for an eventual softening of the
embargo. These conditions include a concrete democratization
process to be developed in Cuba with the political disappearance of
the current leadership. Finally, the controversial legal profile of the
Helms-Burton Act has attracted not only the attention of foreign
interests, but it has also intrigued U.S. legal scholars on grounds as
sensitive as extraterritoriality, violation of international law, and the
citizenship conditions needed in order to enjoy the protection of U.S.
courts. The Helms-Burton Act may have become a case study for
generations of law students to inspect. This is the central topic of this
article.
Any analysis of the origin and consequences of the Helms-
Burton Act has to take into account two distinct and complementary
dimensions. The first is the narrow issue of relations between the
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U.S. and Cuba; and the second is a broader and more diffuse picture
of strategic thinking emanating from the economic and political
decision centers of the United States.
Focusing on the narrow U.S.-Cuba relationship, it is obvious
that the objective of the United States government's Helms-Burton
Act has been fundamentally political. It is aimed at discouraging
foreign investment in Cuba through the threat of lawsuits and the
imposition of travel restrictions to the U.S. by foreign executives
whose companies "traffic" in stolen properties. More fundamentally,
it seeks to generate a deeper economic deterioration to accelerate the
fall of the current Cuban regime. The Helms-Burton Act is the
culmination of the evolution of the U.S. political attitude toward
Cuba'. As its own juridical chronology shows, all U.S. legal actions
have been responses to the inexorable inclination of the Cuban
government toward the Soviet political and economic orbit.
As a prelude to future changes, Cuba began to foster
economic reforms and investment. In 1982, Havana approved a law
to regulate the activities of business consortia, along with
possibilities for long-term leases of properties. Labor regulations
were modified in 1990 to facilitate the establishment of tourism-
related enterprises. Finally, in 1992, some parts of the Cuban
constitution (Articles 14, 15 and 18) were adapted to soften the
prevailing Marxist-Leninist intransigence against private enterprise.
Accordingly, a series of successive measures were taken resulting in
a modest opening to economic activities, which are the basis of
I See Lynn Stoner, Recent Literature on Cuba and the United States, 31
LATIN AM. REs. REV. 235 (1996) (a useful starting point for a review on the
relations between the United States and Cuba); see also Pamela Falk, the U.S.-Cuba
Agenda: Opportunity of Stalemate, 39 J. INTER-AM. STUD. & WORLD AFF.
153(1997)(one of the most recent accounts of pending items).
2 Decreto-Ley Nfimero 50, sobre asociaci6n econ6mica entre entidades
cubanas y extranjeras [Legislative Decree No. 50, Economic Association Between
Cuba and Foreign Entities], Gaceta Oficial, Special Ed. No. 3, Feb. 15, 1982.
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capitalist markets. In September of 1995, Law No. 77 was issued to
regulate foreign investment, in place of Law No. 50 of 1992. The
results of these measures were rather slow to arrive3. However,
according to the Cuban government, the change was noticeable. By
the end of 1994, about 140 joint ventures were operating in Cuba.
At the end of 1995, a total of 212 were formed.
For more than thirty years, the U.S. did not seem to pay too
much attention to the properties that were taken as a result of the
nationalization process decreed by the Cuban Revolution.
Washington and Havana never came to terms in negotiating a
settlement. While the U.S. insisted on full compensation, the Cuban
authorities responded that they should be compensated for the
damage caused by the U.S. embargo. The consolidation of economic
links with Cuba was guaranteed to encounter serious obstacles. In the
1990's, all investments became potential targets for future
confiscation and retaliation emanating from a new twist in U.S.
policy. The immediate translation took the form of a congressional
bill, the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA), later known as the 1992
"Torricelli Act."
For some influential figures, the embargo and its initial
codification through the Torricelli Act was not enough. The
Torricelli Act was still a weapon with limited and indirect impact. It
had no political teeth, so to speak, especially in the international
arena. The Helms-Burton Act was left to redress this limitation.
Once in motion, the perception of this piece of U.S.
legislation, both in the U.S. and abroad, was extremely negative.
Most efforts of finding redeeming values in the evolution and impact
of the Helms-Burton Act are reduced to the understandable litany of
self-serving praise from its main advocates in Congress. While the
hard-line sectors of the Cuban-American exile community have had
good words and expectations for the law, some moderates warned
3 CARMELO MESA-LAGO, ARE ECONOMIC REFORMS
PROPELLING CUBA TO THE MARKET?. (1994) (for a lucid global analysis of
the refons).
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that it could actually prolong Castro's rule. The overall record of
commentaries is a dismal example of concern and anger. Too many
voices focus on the unnerving issue of violation of international law.
In the United States, harsh words such as: a "bad law, 4 a "dangerous
precedent,"5 an "undermine [of] the confidence in the international
legal order,"6 a "blatant illegality,"7 and "one of the worst mistakes"8
made by the U.S. (by former President Jimmy Carter) characterized
the Act. Harvard Professor Jorge Dominguez, one of the most
respected specialists on Cuba, has referred to it as a "dictatorship-
enabling act."9 Normally tame, U.S. jurists referred to the Helms-
Burton Act as "irrationality at its maximum."'" Even incensed
foreign governments have commented on the law by equating it to a
"declaration of economic war."" Setting aside political opinions and
commentaries regarding foreign policy, this comment concentrates on
the legal analysis offered by the U.S. juridical community.
4 See Anthony M. Solis, The Long Arm of U.S. Law: The Helms-Burton
Act, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 709, 740 (1997).
5 Id. at 729.
6 Id. at 740.
7 Susan J. Long, A Challenge to the Legality of Title III ofLIBERTAD and
an International Response, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. Rev. 467,496 (1997).
8 Weekly Notes..., Wash. Times, Jan. 28, 1997, at A14.
9 See Jessica Mathews, This Misguided Plan to Punish Cuba Would
Backfire, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr.5, 1995.
10 See Luisette Gierbolini, The Helms-Burton Act: Inconsistency with
International Law and Irrationality at Their Maximum, 6 FLA. ST. U. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 289 (1997).
11 Caribbean Reacts to Proposed U.S. Law: It is Designed to Deter Closer
Trade Links with Cuba, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Aug. 19, 1997, at 390.
[Vol. 6
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IH. THE LEGAL RESISTANCE
A. Mea Culpa
In the future, when historians proceed to unearth what
predictably will be left of the Helms-Burton Act, they will be able to
easily distinguish between the ephemeral dimensions and the lasting
consequences. Predictably, the negative legacy is probably going to
surpass the accomplishments that the advocates of the law were
seeking, mainly the speedy demise of the Cuban dictatorship. History
will probably forget most of the controversies and confrontations
generated by the Helms-Burton Act. In the not too distant future,
memories will fade away about the chasm that it has opened between
the U.S. and the European Union. The impact inflicted in the inter-
American relations network will probably not reach the seriousness
of other historical episodes that include military interventions in the
Dominican Republic and Panama, not to speak about the Bay of Pigs
and the missile crisis. Disagreement with Spain over the Helms-
Burton Act will probably just become another chapter of the
intriguing triangular relationship between Madrid, Washington, and
Havana. To sum up, in time, history - to use a rewrite of perhaps
the most famous of Castro's expressions - may well forget the
Helms-Burton Act. 2
However, the Act has provided a unique opportunity for
students and legal scholars to observe in theory, if not in practice, one
of the most peculiar legal creations ever issued by the U.S. Congress.
While this comment is being written, the Helms-Burton Act is
becoming a legal case with the potential of capturing a spot in the
legal annals.
What is fascinating about the perception of the law is not the
12 See FIDEL CASTRO, HISTORY WILL ABSOLVE ME (Editorial de
Ciencias Sociales, La Habana ed. 1975) (paraphrasing the famous expression by
Fidel Castro which gave title to one of his most quoted essays).
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fact that customary, rushed commentaries, protests, and endorsements
were generated as soon as it was approved, but that the Helms-Burton
Act has consumed considerable energy within the legal community.
This was predictable if one takes into account the precedent of the
legal studies produced on the long U.S. embargo against Cuba and the
Torricelli Act. It was expected that law scholars would explore the
Helms-Burton Act's potential unconstitutionality and possible
violation of international law.
The intimate linkage between the political origin and the
legislative evolution of the Helms-Burton Act was bound to become
a favorite topic for U.S.jurists. In spite of the traditional disciplinary
resistance of academic institutions and publications, the Helms-
Burton Act has offered a fitting opportunity for commentaries that
simultaneously take into account the legal and political aspects of the
law. While it was expected that political commentators would offer
policy recommendations and venture strong opinions, it is significant
to note that law specialists have been issuing something other than
their usual insightful analysis of the law. Jurists have also inserted
frequent political opinions in their studies. Moreover, they have
carried out this task in the mainstream journals dedicated to
international law and the network of regulations affecting
transnational arrangements and organizations.
However, what is also extraordinary is the notable attention
generated by the scholarly community toward the subject, as well as
the depth of the multiple analyses produced, which match the political
commentaries. A result of the rigorous scrutiny is the degree of
negative criticism. This becomes apparent when the bulk of the
studies are compared with the mild and scarce response offered by
legal scholars and practitioners who have justified the law as
juridically acceptable and politically efficient. As expected, very
early in the process, attorneys offered their services to potential
plaintiffs and defendants. Some lawyers even drafted convincing
[Vol. 6
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pieces endorsing their particular point of view or concern. 13 These
commentaries help in completing the picture, but have to be taken as
what they are: professional announcements from lawyers defending
the interests of their clients.
More important is the realm of scholarly publications.
Considered as a whole, a negative perception of the Helms-Burton
Act would be expected to come from non-U.S. sources. However,
what is striking about the academic corpus to be considered is the fact
that an overwhelming number of the negative cases of analysis are
U.S.-based. It is an impressive exercise of mea culpa. The
commentaries have come in the form of articles, elaborate papers, or
13 Symposium, El refuerzo del embargo de Estados Unidos contra Cuba
[The Strengthening of the United States Embargo Against Cuba], (July 8-10,
1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)(manuscript contains essays and
papers by lawyers participating in the symposium organized by the IRELA
(Madrid) and the Center for International Policy (Washington, D.C.), held in Sitges
(Barcelona), Spain); Robert L. Muse, Legal and Practical Implications of Title III
oftheHelms-Burton Law, The Strengthening ofthe United States Embargo Against
Cuba Symposium (July 8-10, 1996) (unpublished) (the most vocal U.S. voice);
Hermenegildo Altozano, La Ley Helms-Burton y El Derecho Internacional [The
Helms-BurtonAct andInternationalLaw], The Strengthening of the United States
Embargo Against Cuba Symposium (July 8-10, 1996) (unpublished) (expressing
similar points from a Spanish point of view); Hermin de Jesfis Ruiz Bravo and
Manuel MorAn Rufmo, La Ley Helms-Burton: lineas de acci6n para contrarrestar
sus efectos extraterritoriales, The Strengthening of the United States Embargo
Against Cuba Symposium (July 8-10, 1996) (unpublished) (a Mexican angle);
Nick Mallett, The Application in the United Kingdom of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 of the United States of
America, The Strengthening of the United States Embargo Against Cuba
Symposium (July 8-10, 1996) (unpublished) (views of a British attorney); Sergio
Alvarez-Mena, III and Daniel A. Crane, From the Commerce Clause to Caf6
Cubano: The Constitutionality of Helms-Burton, A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. (Oct. 23-
26, 1996) (a sample of the opposing view and siding with the backers of Helms-
Burton presented in the 1996 Fall Meeting of the American Bar Association
International Law Section and Inter-American Law Committee); see Noreen
Marcus,Attorneys Capitalize onAnti-Castro Law; Helms-Burton Sparks Suits, 18
LEGAL TIMES (Washington) 2 (Apr. 8, 1996).
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comments presented under the sponsorship of respected U.S.
academic and legal institutions or have found the necessary
disseminating outlets in U.S. juridical journals. 14
In this instance, domestic criticism of U.S. foreign policy has
not come from liberal academic circles or left-of-center political
sectors, but, as it was also the case with the Torricelli Act, from the
very nucleus of the U.S. legal establishment. It appears, like the
responsible minds of the legal profession thought, that remaining
silent on the Helms-Burton Act would be historically interpreted as
endorsing a document that respected scholars called "a
monstrosity."' 5  Two additional dimensions related to the legal
commentaries on the Helms-Burton Act are worth noting. First, a
scant review reveals an outstanding geographical diversity. The
scholarly publications where the studies have appeared are anchored
in institutions located in a large number of states. The second is the
fact that the topic has attracted the inter-generational attention of law
students,'6 established scholars, and practitioners. As a sample of the
14 As a self-imposed limitation, this comment considers only the scholarly
publications abstracted or indexed by two of the most used search indexes
available: Wilson's Index to Legal Periodicals and Legal Resources Index.
published papers made available to the author by legal practitioners. See supra
note 13.
15 One of the selected epithets bestowed by scholars was spontaneously and
graciously offered by Robert J. Goebel, Director of the Fordham Center on
European Law, participating in the European Community Studies Association
(ECSA) meeting held in Seattle, Wash. (June 1, 1997).
16 Among the authors identified as candidates for law degrees while they
were drafting the essays are the following: Craig R. Auge, Title IV of the
Helms-Burton Act: A Questionable Secondary Boycott, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
BUS. 575 (1997); David S. De Falco, Comment: The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBER TAD) Act of 1996: Is the UnitedStates Reaching Too
Far?, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 125 (1997); Gierbolini, supra note 10; Christine
L. Quickenden, Helms-Burton and Canadian-American Relations at the
Lawyers Meet The Law
interest raised by the Helms-Burton Act in the minds of future law
professionals, the record shows that the International Law Students
Association 17 organized panels for their annual meetings. More
ambitious, the students of the Hastings School of Law held an
impressive symposium on this topic and published the proceedings
and the papers presented by established scholars including U.S. and
Canadian government representatives. This trend reflects two
significant facts. First, the topic has become attractive for novel
scholars, supposedly encouraged by faculty who have supervised the
candidate's research and sponsored their eventual publication. As a
consequence, the rigorous review process that these legal journals
apply to prospective contributions is a guarantee of the seriousness of
the essays.
B. Early Warnings
In the months following the enactment of the Helms-Burton
Act, the pages of legal informative publications appeared to be a
reflection and aprediction of what the strictly scholarlyjournals were
going to subsequently generate. The New York Law Journal and the
Los Angeles Daily Journal, among other publications, offered a
representative sample of the different points of view on the Helms-
Burton Act, with an inclination toward a critical assessment. While
some commentators were adamant about the legitimacy of the
Crossroads: The Need for An Effective, Bilateral Cuban Policy, 12 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 733 (1997); Solis, supra note 4; and Long supra note 7.
17 In 1996, the University of Ottawa Law School held a conference on
diverse topics such as the Helms-Burton Act and the problems associated with
the principle of extraterritoriality.
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conditions imposed on Cuba, 8 others were cautious.' 9 Most writers
were negative and unleashed an early warning about the international
reactions.2 °
Very early in the process, some commentators were very
direct in the language they used, playing the role of the prophet.
Setting the tone of most of his colleagues, Anthony Solis called the
Helms-Burton Act a "bad law"' and a "dangerous precedent"22 that
would "undermine the confidence in the international legal order."23
Luisette Gierbolini, perhaps one of the most direct critics of the law
and its consequences, entitled her article Inconsistency With
International Law and Irrationality at Their Maximum.2 4 As a
representative sample of the policy-influencing judgment rendered by
a substantial number of legal scholars, Theodor Meron and Detlev F.
Vagts concluded in a surgically blunt manner: "[w]e urge that, in the
interest of keeping the United States in compliance with international
law and avoiding unnecessary tensions with our closest allies in
18 Alberto Luzarraga, Castro Must Open Regime Before U.S. Opens to
Cuba, 215 N.Y. L.J. 33, at S1 (Feb. 20, 1996).
19 Susan Kohn Ross & John W. Shi, Sovereignty Matters: The Expanded
Embargo Against Cuba, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Sept. 24, 1996, at 7.
20 See Cecil Johnson, Congress, Isn't This a Parody? Helms-Burton Law
Takes Foolish Approach to International Trade, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Nov. 4,
1996, at 6. See, e.g., Law Against Cuba Will Backfire, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, July
23, 1992, at 6 (strengthening of U.S. trade embargo against Cuba); Evelyn F. Cohn
& Alan D. Berlin, European Community Reacts to Helms-Burton, 218 N.Y. L.J. 24,
at S2 (Aug. 4, 1997).
21 Solis, supra note 4.
22 Id. at 729.
23 Id. at 740.
24 Gierbolini, supra note 10.
[Vol. 6
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Europe and the Americas, President Clinton again exercise the
authority to suspend those provisions of the Act. ' 25 These future
scholars and established experts were not alone.
C. Juridical Dissection
The varied dimensions of the analyses coincide in some
critical aspects, the most important of which coalesce around the
topics of the potential violations of treaties and international law, the
implications derived from U.S. domestic and constitutional law, and
the consequences for judicial procedure.
The main areas of concern can be subdivided into three
clusters. The first area of concern is on the Cuban expropriations.
The main topics focus on the nature of the Cuban properties that were
taken by the revolutionary government after 1959 and the subsequent
absence of monetary compensation. As a result, claimants expected
appropriate restitution as a final result of the embargo. Another issue
related to expropriations is the acceptable identification of claimants
and the subsequent interpretation of what should be the appropriate
citizenship status required by the former owners in order to bring suit.
In addition, scholarly attention is given to the nature of foreign
investment and the interpretation of the label of "trafficking."
The second area of concern concentrates on the domestic
consequencesfront. Here the first issue is the constitutionality of the
law with regard to trade and travel. Second, and more importantly,
commentators raise the question of the codification of past measures
of U.S. foreign policy with Cuba. The third area of concern centers
on the international consequences. Experts were keenly attracted to
the real nature and the political objectives of the measures. As a
consequence, they warn about the implications for international
25 See Theodor Meron & Detlev F. Vagts, TheHelms-BurtonAct: Exercising
the Presidential Option, 91 A.J.I.L. 83, 84 (1997) (advocating suspension of the
Act's provisions which authorize lawsuits by U.S. nationals against foreign entities
that "traffic" in property expropriated by Cuba).
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relations. Basically, the main issues are the extraterritorial aspects of
the law and the alleged violation of treaties and international
agreements signed by the United States. In sum, a combined front,
(formed by the violation of the state doctrine), the sidetracking of the
estoppel concept in interpreting the citizenship of claimants, and the
application of extraterritoriality, constitutes a base for claiming that
the Helms-Burton Act violates international law. These aspects are
examined in detail.
III. ON PROPERTY AND CITIZENSHIP
A. Trafficking in Stolen Property
The jurists who endorse the Helms-Burton Act have based
their arguments mostly on the evidence that the expected and
customary compensation for properties nationalized by revolutionary
processes normally have low prospects of ever being satisfied. This,
however, is not an anomaly that can be exclusively attributed to the
Cuban case. Distinguishing himself as a solitary backer of the law,
attorney Brice M. Clagett has denounced the lack of enforcement for
these procedures. Due to the "notorious weakness and ineffectiveness
of international enforcement mechanisms"26 and "[b]ecause the
jurisdiction of international tribunals is consensual, it is only rarely
that a confiscation case can be brought in such a forum."27 Hence,
"[e]spousal of claims by the victims government can take generations
to bear any fruit.. ."28 As to the causes of the Cuban expropriations
and the lack of compensation, the fact is that both sides are the
26 Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act Is Consistent with
International Law, 90 A.J.I.L. 434, 436 (1996).
27 Id. at 436-437.
28 Id. at 437.
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culprits. The United States never agreed on the initial conditions
offered by Cuba and the Castro government has in turn been
adamantly presenting counterclaims deriving from the monetary
damage inflicted by the U.S. embargo on the Cuban economy.
In any event, with the opening of the Helms-Burton Act to
claims potentially presented by Cuban-Americans, scholars have
pointed out two main aspects directly emanating from the explicitly
stated (punitive and compensatory) monetary objective of the law.
The first is that, in principle, the potential body of contention is huge:
... all properties on the island with which the government of Cuba
is involved in some way are subject to suit.. ."29 With virtually no
private property of any real value, any attempt to deal with any
portion of the Cuban economy is subject to legal procedures. The
second item is the fact that the law rests ". . . too much on...
expropriated property."3 Furthermore, these properties can be traced
back at least two generations3 causing complicated procedural
consequences emanating from successory rights based on different
legal systems.
The legislators had a clear intent when they elected to use a
loaded label to describe what in normal circumstances is a simple
commercial transaction. With the connotation ofunethical, criminal,
and illegal, the Helms-Burton Act's use of the word "trafficking" not
only has irritated foreign interests, but has also alarmed legal
commentators. Andreas Lowenfeld lucidly states that the term
chosen by the legislators to illustrate the nature of the trading with
such properties is actually ". . . a word heretofore applied in
legislation almost exclusively to dealing in narcotics... "32 The
29 Robert Muse, supra note 13, at 5.
30 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90
A.J.I.L. 419,425 (1996).
31 Id. at 433.
32 Id. at 425.
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problem is that when a deep analysis of the operations contemplated
to be considered as "trafficking" is done, the result is that any
commercial activiV3 in Cuba can in principle be considered as
"trafficking." Consequently, any individuals involved in commercial
activities could be affected by the implementation of the Helms-
Burton Act. This has caused many Spanish lawyers to become
alarmed.34
The authors of the Helms-Burton Act have attempted to
reconcile the Act with the guidelines of the American Law Institute
known as the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States of 1984, but this is considered by scholars as
"fundamentally flawed,"35 since the effect of the damage was caused
by the Cuban government, not by the "persons over whom
jurisdiction is sought to be exercised."36 In other words, critics point
out that the U.S. is punishing third parties out of frustration because
it is unable to obtain any results deriving from the long embargo
imposed on Cuba. Therefore, to impose U.S. policies in such a case
is considered "unreasonable by any standard."37
On the issue of the amount of compensation for the damage
caused by dealing with previously expropriated goods, it is obvious
that the monetary expectations may be exaggerated and unreasonable.
These expectations would hinder the success of the legal process.
However, since the real purpose of the law is another, scholars detect
that investors will find that... the choice is between an ice cream
sundae [business in Cuba] and a root canal treatment [expensive court
33 Id.
34 Altozano, supra note 13, at 12.
35 Lowenfeld, supra note 30, at 431.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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suits and loss of businesses in the United States]." It is for this
reason that "the proponents of Helms-Burton are fairly confident that
persons who contemplate investing in Cuba or transactions with Cuba
will change their minds.. ."' This is the real motive of the law, an
opinion shared by the proponents and the critics alike.40
The supporters of the law recognize that the measures are
punitive rather than compensatory in nature. As a result, the award
should not be "unreasonable or excessive."14 1 However, "even
assuming that it could be proven that the damages are not truly
compensatory and that the act reaches persons only tangentially
involved in the targeted trafficking, ' 42 attorneys who justify the law
predict that "the remedy conferred would approach the level
necessary to be disproportionate for due process purposes. 43
In any event, Brice Clagett, an isolated endorser of the law,
considers that the controversial Title III "does no injustice to the
'traffickers'... "I He states that "[t]rafflckers are fully aware that
they are dealing in tainted property; ' 4 they "are knowingly taking the
risk that the dispossessed owners or aggrieved states might take
action..."46 Clagett suggests that".., international human rights
38 Id. at 429.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Alvarez-Mena & Crane, supra note 13.
42 Id.
43 Id
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law recognizes that, at least in certain circumstances, a state violates
international law when it confiscates the property not only of aliens
but of its own citizens."47 He claims that one of the reasons for Title
III is the "premise that international law in all cases forbids a state to
confiscate the property of its national without just compensation."4
Extending the blame to justify the overextension of actions bordering
the violation of international law, the endorsers of the Helms-Burton
Act even place blame on the home states of the companies dealing
with expropriated properties in Cuba because confiscation originally
meant breaking international law.49
B. Citizenship: A Widened Concept
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Helms-Burton
Act, as well as its most fascinating legal detail, is the enlargement of
the pool of potential suitors. What began as a selected and registered
group of claimants, now theoretically encompasses thousands. This
enlargement of the pool originates in the nature of the expropriations,
the subsequent trafficking, and the new identification of candidates
to bring suits in U.S. courts. The law has opened a Pandora's box
with respect to a potential new definition of effective citizenship. It
allows Cubans who became U.S. nationals to enjoy the protection of
U.S. courts, after a waiting period of two years, to redress damages
that were caused before obtaining U.S. citizenship. Before entering
the legal considerations, let us pause for a moment and hear some
early warnings on this new twist that produced a considerable hope
47 Id. at 438.
48 Id. at 439.
49 See Brice M. Clagett, The Controversy Over Title III of the Helms-Burton
Act: Who is Breaking InternationalLaw-The UnitedStates, or the States That Have
Made Themselves Co-conspirators with Cuba in Its Unlawful Confiscations?, 30
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 271 (1996-1997).
[Vol. 6
Lawyers Meet The Law
in the Cuban exile community. Some Cuban-American scholars had
expressed considerable concern for this development. Speaking at a
conference of Cuban economists in exile, when the bill was discussed
in Congress, Ernesto Betancourt, a former director of Radio Marti,
faced the issue:
United States national definition would be detrimental
to encouraging change inside Cuba [... ] Castro has
been holding sessions throughout the island to raise
fear among people that their house and land may be
subject to reclamation from those Cubans who have
become American citizens after their properties were
seized. Without denying the legitimate desire of
former owners to regain the holdings, not only for
economic reasons but in many cases for sentimental
reasons involving childhood and family memories, the
question that should be put to them is: is your offering
to renounce your claim could encourage the end of the
Castro regime, would you insist in getting it back?
Perhaps Cubans have changed a lot, but the history of
the last decades shows that the much maligned
Cuban-American and exile community has been
capable of reacting with generosity and willingness to
foreign whenever faced with crisis.5"
Robert Freer, a participant in the same conference, presented an
elaborate and most convincing paper justifying many of the legal
points of the law. With considerable success, he managed to mute
most of the questions about the numerous criticisms that the bill had
produced. However, he was adamant on the issue of the extension of
50 Emesto F. Betancourt, Potential Impact of the Helms/Burton Act on
Castro's Regime. PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING
ASSOCIATION FORTHE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECoNoMY (ASCE) MIAMI, FLORIDA,
AUG. 10-12, 1995.
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the nationality privileges: "[t]he U.S. has both a responsibility to
initiate advances in international law on the one hand and to be
careful not to'break the crockery' on the other."'" In logical terms, he
recognized that the U.S. legal tradition espouses the notion that "if a
man steals from another and a third party knowingly and intentionally
takes advantage of that theft to receive or beneficially use the fruits
of the theft, that person would be as guilty of that theft as the original
perpetrator."5 However, while stating that the Helms-Burton Act
filled a vacuum in international law, he was not so sure about the
consequences.
By allowing individuals who were not citizens of the
U.S. at the time their loss occurred to take advantage
of this privilege, it deviates from the norm. Those
who favor this extension suggest that the action
created is not a remedy for the "theft" that occurred
when they weren't citizens years ago, but rather for
the "trafficking" that is occurring now when they are
citizens and entitled to equal access to our courts. 3
Echoing the Cuban-American sentiment, Freer stated further:
I am sympathetic to this plea, but I have not been able
to sufficiently separate the Cuban right to determine
the ultimate property rights as to the own citizens
from the "trafficking" issue presented to our courts.
. . I question as matter of policy whether is worth the
51 Robert E. Freer, Jr., Helms-Burton Myths & Reality. PAPER PRESENTED
AT THE FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE
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potential disadvantage to all of us, including Cuban-
Americans, in our world-wide traditional
arrangements, should this notion to a remedy for post-
confiscation nationals gain wider acceptance 4.
Nevertheless, once the law was approved and enacted, the
legal consequences became obvious. Robert Muse, one of the most
vocal legal practitioners opposed to the law, had earlier warned that
"constitutional arguments will be advanced by other national-origin
groups."55 This is a case of retroactive privilege generously granted
by the law which contrasts with the fact that no similar opportunity
is bestowed on former citizens of other countries or regions (e.g.,
Palestinians and Eastern Europeans). It is an open invitation to
lawsuits based on discrimination emanating from ethnic or national
origin. On a more concrete level, the 5,911 certified claimants "will
see their claims diluted to meaninglessness by virtue of thousands of
Cuban American judgments entered against Cuba in the U.S. federal
courts." 6 Ultimately, a political side effect of this new scenario that
will raise "the specter of this potential liability"5 is "bound to have
an inhibiting effect within the U.S. on any attempted rapprochement
with Cuba.""8
The possibility of long and numerous court proceedings has
been theoretically great because the requirements included in Title III
permit that all individuals or companies with expropriated properties
worth at least $50,000 may become plaintiffs. Although the figure
may seem high, the law interprets the value of the property with
54 Id.
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generosity including the fair market estimate and interest. This
means that approximately 400,000 Cubans who are now citizens of
the U.S. may be able to sue those who "traffic" with their former
properties, now in the hands of the Cuban state.5 9 In contrast, only
about 300 U.S. companies or persons could benefit from this law (or
better from the Cuba Claims Act of 1964) because many of such
properties do not have any real market value.
The bill was called by cynics the Bacardi law, in reference to
the emblematic ownership expropriated by the Revolution, and the
fact that the bill was lobbied by the families of the former owners and
other Cuban-Americans of considerable wealth. However, equating
the size of companies and the degree of wealth expropriated with the
energy employed in lobbying for the bill is inaccurate. The reality is
that large companies and individuals with personal interests were not
pleased by the enlargement of the potential pool of claimants because
this would diminish their opportunities of recovering substantial sums
from litigation. An association named the Joint Corporate Committee
on Cuban Claims, with legal residence in Stamford, Connecticut,
composed of more than half of the companies with certified claims,
opposed the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act for precisely this
reason.
C. Facing a U-Turn: The Estoppel
Jurists with different legal backgrounds recognize that "the
nationality of claims principle is a rule of customary international
law."60 However, because the legislators seemed to want to obtain as
59 Ann Davis, Helms-Burton's First Test Comes Soon: Cuban-Americans
Lining Up to Sue Foreign Investors in Cuba Under New Act, 18 NAT'L L.J. 31,
at A6 (Apr. 1, 1996) (expectations of Cuban-Americans were not lost in the eyes
of legal commentaries and reporting).
60 Robert L. Muse, The Nationality of Claims Principle of Public
International Law and the Helms-Burton Act, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L REv.
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much sympathy as possible, they added another dimension to the
already loaded problem of the political objective. In the words of
Robert Muse, "[i]n order to achieve a foreign policy objective with
respect to Cuba, Congress violated the nationality of claims principle
of public international law."'"
A review of recent history in similar cases reveals the novelty
of the Helms-Burton Act. After the passing of the International
Claims Settlement Act of 1949, the Commission has never been
required by Congress to violate international law by considering the
claims of non-nationals at the time of property loss62 . Until now, the
legislators and the President have behaved rather well. "Congress
and the Executive Branch have been in consistent accord in rejecting
the inclusion of claims of anyone other than U.S. nationals at the time
of loss."63 What both the White House and Congress did not seem to
understand is that by performing this consistent, restraining policy,
they were not only adhering to a legal process, but creating, "de
facto," a law that would later convert any other legal measure into a
legally void act. This happens by virtue of estoppel.
In spite of the fact that the U.S. may claim that it is not legally
bound by international agreements on the basis of national security
or that it feels compelled to redress the injustice of expropriations, an
internal legal restraint actually works against this logic. The United
States is "estopped" from inserting the Cuban-Americans, who were
not U.S. citizens at the time of the expropriations, in the list of
candidates capable of filing suits under an activated Title III. Why is
this? Because this action would be in contradiction to the principle
of estoppel.
Estoppel applies when a person gives a reason to believe
777, 783 (1997).
61 Id. at 797.
62 Id. at 785.
63 Id.
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certain facts upon which another person takes action.' The first actor
cannot later deny these facts. The estoppel, known as preclusion in
civil law systems, derives originally from municipal law. Applied to
international law, estoppel is a restraint on a state that in the past, has
declared and performed conduct maintaining a given position, and
then manifests a decision contrary to this pattern. Since international
law can succeed and be respected only if it is based on good faith, any
sort of turncoat behavior is considered a violation. Other members
of the international community cannot easily accept that a well-
patterned doctrine exercised by another state is suddenly and
unilaterally considered as void. This situation only creates confusion
and the loss of mutual good faith. A party can invoke estoppel "when
induced to undertake legally relevant action or abstain from it by
relying in good faith upon clear and unambiguous representation by
another State."65 The International Court of Justice has insisted that
64 This comment does not claim to be authoritative in the scholarly legal
field, but only to serve as a bridge between the sometimes too distant specialties of
international relations and law. While some of the concepts discussed may be too
elementary to legal students (as it is the case of the "estoppel" and the "doctrine of
state"), they are not ordinary items in political science or international relations
articles.
65 Jorg Paul Mller & Thomas Cottier, Estoppel, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 116 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992). As sample of the
world-wide treatment of the "estoppel" in juridical publications see generally
ELISABETH ZOLLER, LA BONNE FOI EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
(1977); ANTOINE MARTIN, L'ESTOPPEL EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC: PRECEDE D'UN APERCU DE LA THEORIE DE L'ESTOPPEL EN
DROIT ANGLAIS (1979); Enrique Pecourt Garcia, El Principio del "Estoppel" y
LaSentencia del TribunallnternacionaldeJusticia enEl Caso del Templo de Preah
Vihdar, 16 REVISTA ESPAIROLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL, 153 (1963); F.
Mosconi, La Dottrina dell' "Estoppel" in Diritto Internazionale, 45 RIVISTA DI
DIRITro INTERNAZIONALE, 388 (1962); Christopher Brown, A Comparative and
Critical Assessment of Estoppel in International Law, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV., 369
(1996); Megan L. Wagner, Jurisdiction by Estoppel in the International Court of
Justice, 74 CAL. L. Rev. 1777 (1986).
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the ".... primary foundation of this principle is the good faith that
must prevail in international relations, in as much as inconsistency of
conduct or opinion on the part of a state to the prejudice of another is
incompatible with good faith."66 The principle dictates that a "...
representing party is barred ('estopped' or precluded) ...from
adopting successfully different subsequent statements on the same
issue."'67 As Judge Spenser stated in the classic case of Temple of
Preah Vihear, "the principle operates to prevent a State contesting
before the Court a situation contrary to a clear and unequivocal
representation previously made by it to another State... "6
The recent history shows a systematic U.S. policy of opposing
the expansion of protection of claims to persons who were not
citizens at the time of their loss. The President, Congress, and the
courts were "undeviating in their adherence to the nationality of
claims principle of international law."69  Therefore, the sudden
inclusion of Cuban-Americans in the pool ofpotential plaintiffs is not
only a pleasant surprise for them, but is also ".... nothing less than an
act of bad faith on the part of the United States in its relations with
other nations and it is, as matter of international law, estopped from
lending support to such claims."7
Lawyers also apply the estoppel principle to counteract the
claims that the Helms-Burton Act is justifiable on the basis that the
expropriations were international human rights violations7 . TheU.S.
66 Muse, supra note 60, at 795 (quoting Case Concerning the Temple of
Preah Vihear, (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15)).
67 MtIller & Cottier, supra note 65, at 116.
68 Id. (quoting Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, (Cambodia
v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15)).
69 Muse, supra note 60, at 795.
70 Id.
71 Id at 795-797.
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recent legal tradition in this field rests on the Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. The list of acts that
justify a change of previous legal patterns are: genocide, slavery,
murder, disappearance, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention,
systematic racial discrimination, and gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights.72 Opponents of the Helms-
Burton Act claim that the list does not include "deprivations of
property."'73
In any event, the debate can be maintained as long as the
contenders find new dimensions to back their arguments, either on the
grounds of national security, ethics, or previous violations of human
rights. Innocently one may ask, "[w]hat is wrong with Congress
bestowing a U.S. federal lawsuit right on individuals and companies
who, it must be emphasized, were Cuban citizens that had properties
in Cuba taken by the government of Cuba pursuant to the laws of
Cuba?"'74 Muse responds "[t]he short answer... is that international
law forbids it" (emphasis added)." He further states "[t]he principle
of international law that eligibility for compensation requires
American nationality at the time of loss is so widely understood and
universally accepted that citation of authority is scarcely necessary."'76
Contrary to the insistence of the Helms-Burton authors, Muse is
precise: "[m]ay the United States provide support, in the form of
Titles III and IV
... to the claims of non-U.S. nationals ... ? The
72 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 (1987).
73 Muse, supra note 60, at 797.




Lawyers Meet The Law
answer is an unequivocal 'No.""' In sum, the
ultimate problem is that the enactment of the law has
produced the additional unwanted result of
discouraging investment; "... what we have done in
enacting Title III in a form that gives rights of suit to
non-U.S. nationals at the time of property loss: We
have violated international law. 78
On the other side, Brice Clagett, justifying this example of
collateral damage, defends the expanded citizenship bestowed on
Cuban-Americans. He claims that the law is correctly based on the
fact that the former Cuban citizens are now U.S. nationals and
therefore, "[tio the extent they are U.S. citizens, the prejudice to them
has a substantial effect on the United States."79 This logic seems to
be another interpretation ofthe concept of espousal. However, critics
of the Helms-Burton Act point out that in order to be legally
acceptable, the concept of espousal needs to meet certain
requirements: (1) U.S. nationality of the claimant; (2) the claimant's
continuous ownership; (3) a wrongful act by the accused nation
which caused damage, loss or destruction of property; (4) reasonable
proof of the value of the loss or damages; (5) exhaustion of all local
remedies available in the accused nation; and (6) negation of
anticipated defenses to be raised by the accused nation 0 . It is
obvious that the case of the Cuban-Americans cannot easily meet the
necessary criteria.8 '
77 Muse, supra note 60, at 779.
78 Muse, supra note 13, at 8.
79 Clagett, supra note 49, at 277.
80 Robert C. Kelso, Espousal: Its Use in InternationalLaw, I ARIZ. J. INT'L
& COMp. L. 233, 237 (1982), noted in Quickendon, supra note 16, at 749.
81 Quickendon, supra note 16, at 749.
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Some backers of the legislation are very confident that the law
is fair and that it would stand in court. They are even concerned that
Cuban-Americans may file suits against the two-year waiting period
required for entering their cases in court. This sounds ludicrous, but
some lawyers might be tempted to claim that the Helms-Burton Act
discriminates against Cuban-Americans by forcing them to wait for
a longer period then the rest of the former owners who were citizens
at the time of the expropriations. In any event, Alvarez-Mena and
Crane believe that Cuban-Americans "will have a difficult time
proving that the two-year waiting period is based on ethnicity... "
While some endorsers of the law would not want to dwell on
this dimension, others have no problems in admitting the direct
connection between the convenience of widening the concept of
citizenship and the foreign policy concern. It appears as the Helms-
Burton Act actually needed all Cuban-American help that it could
amass. Briefing the U.S. Senate, one Cuban-American lawyer stated
that "[i]nclusion of Cuban-Americans is imperative to accomplish the
foreign policy goals... ",3 Ironically, an additional side effect of the
law was either courted by the legislators or it a welcomed
consequence. In any case, this is consistent with a pressing priority
of alien residents and the sponsoring of programs to seek their
citizenship. The fact is that the widening of the pool not only
increased the potential number of claimants, but it has also "invited
more Cubans to seek U.S. citizenship ..."' However, while
supporters of the law may be satisfied with this prospect, a substantial
increase of legal suits could clog the court system and cause
82 Alvarez-Mena and Crane, supra note 13.
83 Muse, supra note 60, at 779, quoted in Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act: Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere and
Peace Corps Affairs, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 128 ((1995) (statement of Ignacio
Sdinchez).
84 Solis, supra note 4, at 725.
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considerable delays in producing effective decisions. Paradoxically,
this would, according to Clagett, convert the political objective of
instant or speedy satisfaction as virtually obsolete. In sum, as more
Cuban refugees become citizens and are enticed to sue, the less the
opportunity they will have to receive compensation. However, it is
imperative to remember that the goal of the Helms-Burton Act was
to discourage investment in Cuba in order to produce an economic
deterioration, which in turn would cause the end of the Cuban regime.
IV. ON CODES AND STATES
A. Tampering with the Constitution
Due to the combination of the polemics generated by the
Helms-Burton Act and some of its specific details, an area that
presents uncertainty is the Act's intrinsic constitutionality. The irony
is that until tested in court, this dimension is restricted to mere
speculation. Critics aspire that some day a high court will declare the
law unconstitutional. Defenders of the law perceive that the
constitutionality of the Helms-Burton Act does not appear to be in
serious question. Moreover, Alvarez-Mena and Crane, two
prominent Miami attorneys, state that the law may be controversial,
"but [that] it does not substantially depart in legal form from many of
its federal precedents.""5 The reality is that the law as it exists today
is only valid at a political level, and has exerted limited influence
only through its economic consequences. But from the point of view
of the U.S. juridical procedure and legal tradition, its effectiveness
remains unproven until tested in court. While Title III remains
suspended and Title IV is only applied to a couple of cases of visa
denials, the Helms-Burton Act is considered a ghost, until a court
acts.
In any event, as it happened in the case of the previous
legislation regulating the embargo against Cuba, critics have
85 Alvarez-Mena & Crane, supra note 13, at 18.
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denounced the limitation imposed on U.S. citizens. Andreas F.
Lowenfeld suggests that the Helms-Burton Act "perverts our
immigration and travel laws.. ."86 It is alleged that the law (Section
102) violates the Constitution's Fifth Amendment, which guarantees
freedom of travel to all U.S. citizens.
A different issue, but of parallel and controversial nature, is
the threat of denying U.S. entry visas to officers (and their families)
of companies that "traffic" with former U.S. properties unduly taken
by the Cuban government. It is widely understood and accepted that
any state has the right to regulate its borders the way it deems fit.
Governments are exercising their sovereignty when they approve
laws outlining the requirements for legal immigration and tourist
visits.
However, at least two issues have the potential of generating
legal procedures leading to the serious questioning of the
constitutionality of the law. The first is the connection between the
decisions of denying visas and the international commitments of the
United States. For example, Canada and the U.S. were already bound
by the pre-NAFTA"7 free trade commitments. The denial of visas to
Canadian executives may violate this treaty, which is constitutionally
binding. American individuals who feel that their constitutional
rights have been violated by not having access to Canadian sources,
social and economic opportunities and profitable investment, may
have valid grounds for filing a suit against the U.S. government.
The second legal concept that may be used at any time to
contest the denial of visas is the perturbing fact that the regulation is
included in a legal text that, as a whole, may be considered as a
violation of international law. In other words, a simple administrative
restriction that in normal circumstances may be not only be legal, but
reasonable, (denying visas for multiple reasons) may turn out to be a
86 Lowenfeld, supra note 30, at 434.
87 North American Free Trade Agreement.
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serious violation of fundamental laws. Thus, it may become
unconstitutional because it is a fundamental part of a law that violates
international law which is legally binding on the U.S. government.88
However, critics may discover even better grounds for claiming the
unconstitutionality of the law when studying the most basic aspects
of the text and its most explicit objectives.
B. Codifying the Embargo
The supporters and opponents of the Helms-Burton Act agree
on at least one major area related to the immediate and long range
consequences of the law. The Act means something unique: a
"codification of U.S. foreign policy."89 Moreover, the Helms-Burton
Act has imposed a foreign policy goal on the U.S. court system.
Critics allege that this is a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine and an unprecedented case of curtailing the privileges of the
President of the United States to conduct foreign policy. In addition,
the law codifies a transitory item in the foreign policy agenda by
elevating it to the status of federal law. It forces the President to rely
on the consent of Congress to modify the previous requirement of the
embargo. Furthermore, it conditions its abrogation to the explicit
restoration of democracy in Cuba, the political disappearance of
Castro himself, and the rebirth of a market economy with a clear set
of rules.
Even though the President can, as he did on four previous
occasions (June 1996, January 1997, June 1997, and January of
1998), suspend the effective execution of Title III for periods of six
months, the political character of the law renders it easily
manipulable. For example, when a political change takes place in
88 Maria Soledad Torres Macchiavello, Antecedentes sobre la ley Helms-
Burton, 71 REVISTA DIPLOMACIA 54 (December 1996) (a Chilean view on this
issue).
89 Solis, supra note 4, at 711.
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Cuba, not all of the requirements may be met if the ensuing reforms
are slow and progressive, or if the details are not to the liking of the
proponents and inspirers of the law. Lowenfeld states that "freezing
the details of a program of economic denial as of a given date is
unwise. I do not go so far as to say it is unconstitutional, but it does
impair the ability of the President to conduct foreign relations."9 He
further warns that the Helms-Burton Act ".... hampers the discretion
of the executive branch.. ,"91 and "... purports to micromanage a
transition whose contours no one can predict... "92
Other scholars signal that this is a case of "growing
domestication of American foreign policy."93 This may be a sign that
" .. foreign affairs may no longer 'be different"' 94 than other areas,
but the real danger is the ".... injection of adversarial legalism into
the foreign policy decision-making process. . ."I Specialists predict
that "[w]ith the continued passage of increasingly bold extraterritorial
legislation, the judiciary will be less and less able to maintain a
passive role in foreign affairs." 96 As a consequence, the dilemma is
".... whether turning the federal courts into weapons of foreign policy
90 Lowenfeld, supra note 30, at 422.
91 Id. at 433.
92 Id.
93 John Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons ofForeign Policy: The Case of the
Helms-Burton Act, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 747, 776 (1997).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Bret A. Sumner, Due Process and True Conflicts: The Constitutional
Limits on Extraterritorial Federal Legislation and the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 46 CATH. U. L. REv. 907, 960-
961 (1997).
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ultimately is in the nation's best interests. 9 7
Some experts were definitely bold in their statements on this
issue. According to Lowenfeld, ".... Congress wants to use the
courts as instruments in furthering its own foreign policy objectives
... [and] ... this is an unhealthy development.""8 He was backed by
Solis in this opinion: "[e]xecuting a foreign policy via the U.S. courts
is both an abuse of the judicial process and an unwise precedent..
"99
Alternatively, Alvarez-Mena and Crane, speaking as the
minority of lawyers who justify the law on the issue of diminishing
the president's powers, optimistically opine that ".... the separation
of federal powers, as they relate to foreign affairs, is by no means a
well-settled question." '  They consider that "[u]nlike the War
Powers Act, . . . Helms-Burton deals only with areas in which
Congress and the President share concurrent power."''1 Alvarez and
Crane prefer to believe that the President holds the power to conduct
foreign affairs, but ".... does not hold exclusive power to formulate
foreign policy."' o2 The difference is subtle: "[the] President has
power to administer, but not necessarily to formulate, foreign
policy."'0 3 Following the logic of the Helms-Burton Act, "[d]irecting
the President to pursue particular policy objectives pursuant to the
United States' existing treaties seems to be an entirely reasonable
97 Yoo, supra note 93, at 776.
98 Lowenfeld, supra note 30, at 428.
99 Solfs, supra note 4, at 724.
100 Alvarez-Mena & Crane, supra note 13, at 16.
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exercise of Congressional power."' 4 This is justified on the basis
that ".... the Supreme Court has yet to draw many of the boundary
lines between Presidential and Congressional powers in foreign
affairs, and because the Constitution itself is relatively silent on these
issues, it is impossible to state for certain that Helms-Burton would
survive a challenge of the sort raised by the State Department."' 0 5
However, a confrontation between the Executive and the Legislative
powers, something that has not yet happened, is unpredictable.
Still, whatjurists and political commentators have noted is the
extraordinary precedent in domestic U.S. law of the President
handing a major foreign policy decision to Congress. In contrast, the
Torricelli Act, at least, provided for carefully calibrated responses in
lifting the embargo. The Helms-Burton Act, if totally enacted, would
not offer this flexibility.
C. Detecting the Real Purpose of Helms-Burton
Focusing on the possible violation of U.S. law, the
generalized scholarly consensus is very critical (with few, sporadic
exceptions) of the constitutionality of the Helms-Burton Act. This
diagnosis is based on the obvious political objectives of the law
taking precedence over juridical and commercial arguments. Some
of the most concrete criticisms are blunt and direct, without skirting
undiplomatic remarks under the cover of legalese.
For most, the Helms-Burton Act is a ". . . foreign policy
exercise thinly disguised as jurisprudence."'0 6 It is simply ".... little
more than a foreign policy adorned with the legal equivalent to the
104 Id.
105 Id. at 18.
106 Muse, supra note 60, at 779.
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emperor's clothing."' 7 Critical commentators have tried to find some
good in the objective, but they have failed. Lowenfeld suggests that
"[p]erhaps all of this could be forgiven if the Helms-Burton Act could
really bring about liberty and democracy in Cuba. [But] I see no
reason to believe that it will do so."'08 This view is shared by others
across the Atlantic. Spanish attorney Altozano remembers that an
increase in the pressure exerted on the domestic U.S. scene did not
have any noticeable impact to provoke change of regime in Cuba.'0 9
According to Lowenfeld, it is clear that the aim of the Helms-
Burton Act is to ".. . deter nationals of third countries from doing
business with and investing in Cuba."110 In spite of the publicly
stated purpose and its selling for electoral purposes, the final
objective is not ". . . to compensate investors hurt by the Cuban
revolution, but to affect the behavior of persons in third countries..
.""' This is the reason why British attorney Nick Mallett warns his
prospective clients that the tactic is to ". . . create a psychological
perception that to do business with Cuba will subject a non-U.S.
businessperson to claims in the U.S. and denial ofa U.S. entry visa." 2
Some commentators, in turn, consider this as a positive measure.
Saturnino E. Lucio points out that the "U.S. appears to have drawn a
'line in the sand' against Cuba and has now explicitly required
foreign persons to essentially choose between the U.S. and Cuba.
The obvious conclusion of the U.S. Congress and the President is that
107 Solfs, supra note 4, at 740.
108 Lowenfeld, supra note 30, at 434.
109 See Altozano, supra note 13.
110 Lowenfeld, supra note 30, at 426.
111 Id. at 427.
112 Mallett, supra note 13, at 1.
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these foreign persons will prefer to maintain their ties to the United
States and consequently foreign investment in Cuba will cease or
substantially decline."' 3 From a European point of view, while the
actual results are open to speculation and subjective interpretation,
the basic objective of discouraging investment is, according to
Altozano, already accomplished, just by publishing the law."4
However, American scholars consider that a review of history shows
a prediction of more failure, as far as the ultimate stated goal is
concerned - the fall of the Castro regime. Vaughan Lowe sums up
the overwhelming logical conclusion: "The lesson apparently
inferred from this is that if 36 years of sanctions have proved
ineffective to change the Castro regime, we must have more. The
wisdom of that policy is not self-evident."'' 5
D. A Thorny Issue: Extraterritoriality
Critics and endorsers of the Helms-Burton Act agree on the
controversial nature of expanding the reach of U.S. courts to cover
actions that took place well beyond the American borders.
Extraterritoriality has been the battle word even since the passing of
the Torricelli Act. Its nature is so obvious that it has not been denied
by the sectors behind the approval of the Helms-Burton Act.
However, the Act is not only played on a domestic scenario, but it
transcends the U.S. borders in a manner that has attracted world
attention. It is hardly unique. It looks like globalism also applies to
legal dimensions, with the added potential of generating legal
113 Satumino E. Lucio, II, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996: An Initial Analysis, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
325, 342 (1995-1996).
114 See Altozano, supra note 13.
115 Vaughan Lowe, U.S. ExtraterritorialJurisdiction: The Helms-Burton and
D'Amato Acts, 46 INT' & COMP. L. Q. 378, 385 ((1997).
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violations. Based on this latest development, commentators point out
that "... extraterritorial legislation seems to be in vogue."" 6 With a
united voice, critics have based their opposition on this issue, a fact
that is well taken by foreign attorneys.1 7 For Lowenfeld, as for most
experts, this is an obvious case of "classical secondary boycott,""'
which is contrary to international law because it seeks to
unreasonably force conduct that takes place outside of the state
willing to exercise itsjurisdiction." 9 It is clear from the beginning of
its text that the Helms-Burton Act"... seeks to impose American
policy judgments on nationals of friendly foreign states in a manner
that is both unlawful and unwise."' 20 This is also reflected by jurists
across the Atlantic. In the words of Cambridge University professor
Vaughan Lowe,"... the United States is usurping the rights of foreign
States when it legislates for conduct of foreign persons in foreign
countries.' 2'
Legal experts opposed the law, as well as their counterparts
in Congress, were aware, at an early stage, that any legislation which
deals with implementation across the borders of states is bound to
confront the act of state doctrine. For Solis, the doctrine "...
precludes U.S. courts from inquiring into the validity of public acts
that a recognized sovereign power has committed within its own
116 Solis, supra note 4, at 709 (referring to the Helms-Burton Act and the
subsequent passage of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, PUB. L. No. 104-
172, 110 Stat. 1541 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1997))).
117 See Altozano, supra note 13.
118 Lowenfeld, supra note 30, at 429.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 434.
121 Lowe, supra note 115, at 378.
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territory.'22 A hundred years ago, the United States Supreme Court
inaugurated its long standing adherence to this position with the
milestone case of Underhill v. Herndndez.'23 In Underhill, Chief
Justice Fuller opined that "[e]very sovereign state is bound to respect
the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on acts of the government of another,
done within its own territory."' 4 Its logic is simple: acts of one state
cannot be subject to judicial inspection by another state. Therefore,
the Helms-Burton Act, according to David de Falco, "... violates
international law because it does not have a legally accepted basis on
which it may apply extraterritorially to acts by foreign nationals on
foreign soil."' 25
A basic understanding of international law teaches that if a
state executes something illegal, according to international law, the
parties that suffer the damage cannot place the issue at the
international level against such state, but can only file claims in the
state where the damage was done. In the event that this procedure
does not obtain satisfactory results, plaintiffs then can ask their own
state to file at the international level the complaint against the
violator.126 In view of this, the Helms-Burton Act is a shortcut for a
procedure that has never taken place.
Nonetheless, experience has shown that some acts of a given
122 Solis, supra note 4, at 723 (citing as support RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 444 (1986) and Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, (1964)).
123 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
124 Solis, supra note 4, at 723 (quoting Underhill v. Herndndez from Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino).
125 De Falco, supra note 16, at 126.
126 See Altozano, supra note 13.
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state may be contrary to international law or to the policy of another
state that suffers such acts. In the landmark case of Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino'27 the U.S. Supreme Court declined to apply
the doctrine on cases that may violate international law. For this
reason, Congress passed the Second Hickenlooper Amendment,
amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and permitting courts
to decline the application of the state doctrine if properties of U.S.
nationals were taken in violation of international law.'28
Understandably, supporters of the Helms-Burton Act were eager to
use this new dimension in their favor, in the event that Congress was
also seeking guarantees.
Critics of the Helms-Burton Act recognize that the legislators
protected themselves very wisely from potential conflicts between a
Title III suit and the act of state doctrine. "The authors.., dealt with
this problem head-on," by declaring that courts would not be able to
apply the doctrine and decline action if suits were filed.'29 It is a fact
that Congress "does not trust the executive branch, and it does not
trust the judicial branch."'30 Susan Long, in the concluding remarks
of her study, expressed that "... Title III still presents constitutional
problems since it expressly requires U.S. courts to disregard the Act
of State Doctrine. Such a provision runs in the face of the U.S.
Constitution's framework regarding separation of powers and the
power of the Executive and Legislative branch to have a final say
regarding foreign affairs."13
Supporters of the Helms-Burton Act rely on the Restatement
(Third) ofForeign Relations Law ofthe United States as justification
127 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
128 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)(1994).
129 Lowenfeld, supra note 30, at 427.
130 Lowe, supra note 115, at 428.
131 Long, supra note 7, at 496.
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for extraterritoriality. Some forms of extraterritoriality appear to be
permissible under Section 402 of the Restatement. 3 2 Legislators and
scholars who support the Helms-Burton Act claim that substantial
effects of the expropriations and subsequent actions of the Cuban
government have had an impact on the territory of the United States
Therefore, the implementation of extraterritoriality may seem to be
reasonable. Critics of the law counteract that although the problem
is that the Cuban government caused the "effect," the punishment,
inflicted by the eventual application of the law, lays upon foreign
corporations.'33 This means that the Castro government, the real
"culprit," is not legally affected.'
Lawyers defending the Helms-Burton Act admit that
"Congress intended Helms-Burton to apply extraterritorially"'35
because its aim is to prosecute anyone who traffics in confiscated
property. 3 6  They claim that "[t]he Supreme Court has never
suggested that the Constitution imposes any limit upon extraterritorial
statutes."' 37 Notwithstanding the fact that "the Supreme Court has
not erected constitutional barriers to extraterritorial application of
American law, some of the lower federal courts, the Ninth Circuit in
132 See Solis, supra note 4, at 721 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(c)(1986))("[a] state has
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to... conduct outside its territory that has
or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.").
133 Id.
134 Id. at 721-722.
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particular, have declared some... limits."'38 However, ".... in the
vast majority of cases there will be some slight link to the United
States so as to satisfy even the dictates of the Ninth Circuit."' 39
On the matter of U.S. interference with external affairs,
Clagett outlines his arguments in the following manner:
Because of the proximity of Cuba to the United States
and the history of relations between the two countries,
Cuba's persistence in suppressing democracy,
violating human rights, and refusing to satisfy
international law claims against it has substantially
[sic] impact the United States in a variety of ways,
including the recurring crises caused by the flight of
refugees. The United States has legitimate interests in
bringing these problems to an end. It has reasonably
concluded that discouraging foreign investment in
tainted Cuban property is an appropriate and
proportionate means toward that goal. 140
E. Agreements & Conventions: The Violation of International
Law
Exemplary of the tone of both the attitudes and analysis of
American scholars and foreign reactions, Meron and Vagt suggest
that "[w]hile there are divisions among American international
lawyers as to whether they [the Helms-Burton Act and Congress]
violate international law, there seems to be general agreement...
among foreign governments and publicists that they do."''4 The
138 Id. at 9.
139 Id.
140 See Clagett, supra note 49, at 278.
141 Meron & Vagts, supra note 25, at 84.
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danger of violating international law was so obvious at the start, that
U.S. government officials warned about this very early. During
President Clinton's first term, his Secretary of State recommended
that he veto the bill, even though President Clinton himself initially
resisted to endorse the bill.
In the area of international agreements, it is alleged that
Section 103 of the law (and its precursors regarding
extraterritoriality) violates the common understanding of international
law and different legal instruments signed by the U.S. The array of
international networks that include explicit and legally bounding
commitments that may be in conflict with the intent or the actual
implementation of the Helms-Burton Act is rather large.
On the general area of the United Nations, foreign experts
have pointed out to clients and general readers the potential violations
of Article 2.1 of the U.N. Charter and Resolution 2625 (XXV) of the
General Assembly, regarding principles of international law. 42 The
Helms-Burton Act may be in conflict with the decision of the
International Court of Justice via its judgment of June 27, 1986,
related to the confrontation between the U.S. and Nicaragua 43 .
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank
(the twin Bretton Woods institutions) are also affected because the
Helms-Burton Act provides that ". . . if any financial institution
approves a loan or other assistance to the Cuban government over the
opposition of the United States, then the Secretary of the Treasury
shall withhold from such institution payment of a corresponding
amount...,," This is a violation of Articles 8 and 9 of the IMF
statute and Articles 6 and 10 of World Bank regulations.
1 45
142 Altozano, supra note 13, at 6.
143 Id. at7.
144 Lowenfeld, supra note 30, at 423.
145 Id.
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In the inter-American scene, Articles II and XI of the Inter-
American Development Bank regulations are also violated on the
same grounds. In the most recent regional web created by the U.S.,
Helms-Burton runs against the entire juridical and trade conceptual
basis of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
especially Articles 1105 and 1603, and possibly 309.
Finally, the scope of the GATT and the WTO also suffer the
consequences of the U.S. decision. Specifically, GATT Article XI
would permit various challenges. Moreover, any U.S. use (as
Washington has announced) of the Helms-Burton Act as a national
security exception threatens the GATT protections of the multilateral
trading system. Experts remind that the Helms-Burton uses
ambiguous language to discourage foreign business relationships with
Cuba.'46 Therefore, potential GATT challenges to the law would
include "denial of most-favoured-nation-treatment pursuant to
Article I... [and] denial of national treatment pursuant to Article III
...4"I" Finally, even if the U.S. maintains that Cuba is a national
security threat, "Helms-Burton employs means of questionable
proportionality."'48
Supporters of the law and the U.S. government's position
stress the constitutionality of the Helms-Burton Act and its
compliance with the principles of international law. They attempt to
justify the potential violations on the basis that "the United States did
not relinquish its sovereignty when it signed NAFTA and GATT."'14 9
146 See Riyaz Dattu & John Boscariol, GAYTArticleXXI, Helms-Burton and
the Continuing Abuse ofthe National Security Exception, 28 CANADIAN BUS. L.J.,
198,201 (1997).
147 Id. at 202-203.
148 Id. at 207.
149 Brian J. Welke, GATT and NAFTA v. the Helms-Burton Act: Has the
United States Violated Multilateral Agreements?, 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
361, 378 (1997).
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In contrast, with the early warnings the U.S. government, in its
sparse elaborate public discussions, managed to justify the alleged
wrongdoings only on the basis of the expropriating process
undertaken by Cuba almost four decades ago. David Kaye, an
official representative of the State Department participating in the
symposium organized by the Hastings Law School, explained in this
manner the logic of Helms-Burton: "it still remains to be shown that
international law contains any principle or rule that would deny the
United States the right to create such a domestic civil remedy."'5 For
Washington, there are still "good reasons" for the Helms-Burton Act:
"mass nationalization of property of foreign nationals, carried out in
a discriminatory manner, without the provision of an effective
domestic remedy to obtain compensation and without the willingness
to provide compensation in a negotiated settlement."''
V. A PRICE To PAY: CONSEQUENCES
A. The Political Cost
As we have seen, the Helms-Burton Act has become a
transdisciplinary experience as a result of the analytical scope which
has been applied. The law has attracted the attention of political
analysts, as well as legal experts. Significantly, both groups coincide
in their emphasis on the political consequences of the law, especially
in the international area, as a prediction, confirmation, or commentary
of what actually took place once several foreign governments or
international organizations were compelled to act.
To set the tone, Lowe is very generous in distributing the
blame: "problems will continue as long as States persist in using
150 David Kaye, The Helms-Burton Act: Title III and International Claims,
20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 729, 745 (1997).
151 Id.
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businesses as tools of an over-reaching foreign policy, and do so in
a manner which displays a cavalier indifference to the constraints of
the rules of international law.. ."15 Converted into foreign policy
gurus, lawyers are blunt in their descriptions of future gloomy
scenarios. Robert Muse rhetorically asks: ".... if the United States
elects to violate the nationality provision of international claims law
today, can it tomorrow condemn with any moral authority a nation
which chooses to violate, with respect to U.S. citizens, the full
compensation standard of that same body of law?"'53 He believes that
".... the U.S. and its citizens, both corporate and individual, have a
great stake in the effective international rule of law [and that] [to be
effective this law must be adhered to by all nations of the world - it
is neither right nor ultimately very wise for the United States to do
otherwise. The price, in the end, will prove too great for
everyone."' 54
On a day to day level, the application of controversial Title IV
presents "practical limitations,"'55 and its enforcement may prove
"insurmountable,"156 as the task of the State Department would prove
once the process was set in motion. To compile data about the details
of foreign investment in Cuba and the links of companies trafficking
with the U.S. would be a very cumbersome task. The sensitive
decision of sending warning letters denying visas is a mission that
many diplomats would not like to take lightly. Overall, it is a "source
of obvious embarrassment to the U.S. State Department' 57 and an
152 Lowe, supra note 115, at 390.
153 Muse, supra note 13, at 12-13.
154 Id
155 Auge, supra note 16, at 591.
156 Id.
157 Lowe, supra note 115, at 388.
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"expression of a parochial policy of the United States towards Cuba
"158
On the other hand, as far as what can be called "international
public relations," commentators agree that the sole announcement of
the law already has negative side effects for the U.S. because the
"[exclusion of foreign nationals on this basis could damage
diplomatic relations, interfere with foreign policy objectives, and
negatively impact both international business commitments and
domestic industries."' 59 The image of the United States in these
changing times suffers "when U.S. power is brought to bear to
enforce a law whose legality among the international community is
at least suspect, if not firmly rejected, the legitimacy of both U.S.
power and international law are threatened."' 60 In sum, the law ...
breeds resentment toward the United States...
Experts wonder about the amount of wasted energy and
attention that the whole process has generated. They ask about the
"... hours spent dealing with the extraterritorial aspects.. ."162 and
insist that it is . .. undesirable to rest the implementation of foreign
policy upon the accidents of private litigation, and to impose the costs
of that policy upon random individual and corporate defendants.
". , 163 The result has been that alternatives attempting to solve the
basic problems have been derailed. Lowe denounces that "[t]he
determination of the authors of Helm-Burton to enact watertight
158 Id.
159 Auge, supra note 16, at 575.
160 Solis, supra note 4, at 711.
161 Id. at 741.
162 Lowe, supra note 115, at 389.
163 Id.
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legislation has deflected attention away from more pragmatic
solutions. " "6
On a more practical level, taking into account the priorities of
today's global economy, experts advise ". . against taking bold
unilateral actions in foreign and trade policy matters at a time when
nations are moving toward more interdependent trade arrangements
and relying on bilateral and multilateral trade cooperation rather than
unilateral mechanisms such as quotas and tariffs."' 65 Ultimately, the
United States is the loser. William S. Dodge points out that "[t]he
United States' violation of international law norms .. .has been
aggressively challenged by other nations and this, in turn, has
pressured the United States towards compliance with international
law by suspending the right of action under Title III." '166 Finally, on
this apparently pragmatic solution taken by the administration,
Quickendon is particularly unkind: ".... what good is Title III if
political concerns require it to exist in a state of indefinite
suspension?"'67 She points out that this "... dual position.., where
the United States simultaneously lauds and suspends the provision,
only serves to discredit the legislation."' 68 In spite of this warning,
President Clinton has done so four times.
B. Recommendations: Lawyers Counsel on Foreign Policy
Due to the political nature of the law, the legal community,
understandably, has not been able to resist the temptation or the
164 Id.
165 Solis, supra note 4, at 710.
166 William S. Dodge, The Helms-Burton Act and Transnational Legal
Process, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 713, 726 (1997).
167 Quickendon, supra note 16, at 766.
168 Id
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compulsion to assess the juridical status of the whole process and its
consequences, as well as offer policy recommendations, normally
derived from policy-influencing think tanks. A minority of
commentators seem to agree with the course taken by Congress in
spite of the side effects caused by retaliation because the law is still
the most effective way of discouraging investment. 69
The majority of experts, however, do not share this rosy,
isolated view. Some are more blunt than others, but most agree on a
cluster of negative perceptions and recommendations to correct the
damage. The basic problem, according to the majority of legal
experts, is that by discouraging investments the United States has
chosen the doubtful mechanism of infringing international norms.
With considerable humor, Robert Muse pointed out that allowing
such penalties for confiscations is like permitting drivers who find
parking spaces filled by pedestrians to run them over. 7 In order to
redress this anomaly, the Helms-Burton Act either should be repealed
or should be modified.
A number of the analysts believe that the United States needs
to be more flexible in its aims toward Cuba. Pragmatism should
replace unrealistic objectives. Washington must attempt to form a
cooperative arrangement with other nations regarding investment in
Cuba and seek the best ways to facilitate a peaceful transition. A
detailed reading of some of the commentaries will provide further
insight about the arguments of the experts.
Luisette Gierbolini perceives that the law "may backfire"' 7'
because it has "provided Castro's regime with support from Cubans
on the island who otherwise may have risen against the regime."'172
169 See Welke, supra note 149.
170 Muse, supra note 13, at 8.
171 Gierbolini, supra note 10, at 319.
172 Id.
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In her analysis, ".... Helms-Burton confirms Castro's rhetoric of the
U.S. as an imperialistic, evil neighbor."' 73 As far as the terms of the
law, they are "unrealistic,"' 74 and ". . . have been drafted by
Washington bureaucrats and lobbyists who failed to consider the
reality of international relations and who disregarded the importance
of consistent U.S. trade policies."'75 She further states that ".... the
Act must at least be modified and, at best, repealed. If Helms-Burton
is not found to be a violation of international law, nothing will stop
Congress from passing similar laws in the future. Other countries
could follow U.S. steps.'" 76
According to Robert Muse, the law:
... must be amended to remedy [this] violation. If the
United States persists in a continuing breach of
international law it will undermine the global rule of
law to the detriment of the citizens of this country.
How, after all, can the United States demand
compliance with international law by other nations
when it is in violation of that very system of law? The
short and obvious answer is that it cannot.
177
The isolation of the U.S. is obvious: "[s]tatutes that expressly flout
international law... may set a dangerous international precedent. In
general, countries do not wish to be perceived as outside the
173 Id.
174 Id. at 320.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 320-321.
177 Muse, supra note 60, at 797-798.
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international legal system."' 78
The voices of reason seem to concentrate on the urgency of
changing course. Solis thinks that the ".... best interest of the United
States [is] to amend the Act in order to maintain foreign policy
consistent with, at the very least, the international legal principles that
it recognizes and to show respect for the international agreements and
bilateral relationships from which it greatly benefits."' 79 Quickendon
advises that "Congress should consider severing Titles III and IV..
"180 However, because the U.S. government will lose face if it does
not somehow enforce Title III, which is more or less what it has been
doing since, "Clinton should consider its permanent suspension."181
Other commentators leave the door open to positive alternatives: ".
. [f]lexibility will permit the executive to raise potential violations
of international law as justifications for avoiding implementation of
certain statutory provisions. '
For other commentators, the right course is a more cohesive
and coordinated policy to ameliorate the friction caused by the basic
controversial problem (foreign investment in Cuba) and to foster the
ultimate political aim (the Cuban process of political transition). For
example, instead of implementing isolated measures, the U.S. must
try to reconcile its goals with other views "[to retain dignity... the
United States must successfully obtain concrete measures from both
the European and Canadian allies to work with Cuba in the promotion
178 W. Fletcher Fairey, The Helms-Burton Act: the Effect oflnternationalLaw
on Domestic Implementation, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1289, 1334 (1997).
179 Solis, supra note 4, at 712.
180 Quickendon, supra note 16, at 761.
181 Id. at 762.
182 Fairey, supra note 178, at 1333.
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of democracy."' 83  Another commentator stated that instead of
wasting resources on measures that are "hard to implement," '84 and
losing "precious international political capital,' 85 what is needed is
a "diplomatic dialogue."' 86 At the core of the controversy is the
innate nature of coercive moves "[b]ecause U.S. sanction laws often
are the source of international condemnation and legal challenges,
Congress may avoid the legal problems associated with laws such as
the Helms-Burton Act by enacting a comprehensive international
sanction law."'87 It is therefore mandatory to "... repeal the Helms-
Burton Act altogether and formulate a Cuba policy around U.S.
principles that reflect sound international legal concepts."'88
Specifically, there is a need to "replace the current litany with more
general principles."' 89
Fairey bases his arguments on the fact that "[t]he globalization
of commerce has resulted in a closer relationship between
international and domestic legal systems."'"9 For this reason, in the
United States, ".... lawmakers must understand the consequences of
enacting legislation that impinges on international legal
183 Quickendon, supra note 16, at 762-763.
184 Maria L. Pagan, U.S. Legal Requirements Affecting Trade with Cuba, 2
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 289, 314 (1995).
185 Id.
186 Id. at 315.
187 Fairey, supranote 178, at 1333-1334.
188 Solis, supra note 4, at 739.
189 Id at 740.
190 Fairey, supra note 178, at 1335.
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obligations."'' In his view, "[tihe Helms-Burton Act provides a
good example of a foreign policy sanction law that may have its
purpose undermined by the judiciary's interpretive rules."'9 2 One
important problem is that "[t]he Act appears to have no purpose
without extraterritorial application, but it is textually ambiguous,"'l93
and therefore is open to judicial interpretation. Fairly considers that:
[a]lthough violation of international law comes at a
cost, Congress has the domestic authority to decide to
pay that price in exchange for what it determines to be
important national priorities . .[In turn], [a]bsent
clear congressional intent, however, courts may
undermine those priorities. The courts may not have
an interpretive role in applying the Helms-Burton Act,
because certain provisions never may become
effective. However, courts increasingly will face the
problems the Act raises. Congress has the legal
authority to avoid the problems. Congress also has
the legal responsibility to adhere to the international
obligations it created.'94
What the United States needs is a more pragmatic approach
to defuse the uncompromising situation caused by the combination
of the confrontation with Cuba, the expropriations, the embargo, and
the recent legislative measures. Rupinder Hans reminds that "...
LIBERTAD has been called the dictatorship-enabling act, because it
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United States for Cuba's problems." '195 Other observers believe that
"[b]y joining the rest of the world in limited trade with Cuba, the
United States will remove the smoke screen that Castro is presently
using to keep the truth from the Cuban people."'196 Hans recommends
that "... the embargo should be replaced by a policy of reconciliation
with Cuba, which stands a far better chance of initiating meaningful
political change, and also, allows American businesses a chance to
invest in a growing economy.
In the long run, cooperation rather than conflict is more likely
to achieve change. 97 Therefore, according to Professor David P.
Fidler of the Indiana University School of Law, what is needed is a
compromise and cooperation:
the United States and its liberal allies use economic
interdependence with a vengeance against Castro's
struggling regime. This strategy would not condition
expanded trade and investment on democratic reforms
in Cuba; it advocates for opening the floodgates of
capitalism on Castro's rickety regime... Recasting
liberal realism and liberal internationalism in this way
would pit the Marxist dinosaur Castro against the
high- powered, fast-moving forces of global
capitalism. Castro would have difficulty controlling
the consequences of such a liberal strategy.'98
195 Rupinder Hans, The United States' Economic Embargo of Cuba:
International Implications of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of
1995, 5 J. INTL. L. & PRAc. 327, 346 (1996).
196 De Falco, supra note 16, at 154.
197 Hans, supra note 195, at 345.
198 David P. Fidler, LIBERTAD v. Liberalism: An Analysis of the Helms-
Burton Act from within Liberal International Relations Theory, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 297, 352 (1997).
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Professor Fidler further proposes:
[t]he next convergence has to come on the roles of
international organizations and international law...
A potential convergence can be found in using
multilateral fora to negotiate an agreement among
liberal States that addresses the controversy in
international law exposed by the Helms-Burton
dispute.. .[Additionally,] ... an ethical convergence
has to be created. [... ] Clearly, negotiations between
the United States and Cuba on a lump-sum settlement
for victimized property owners will have to be
undertaken as their relations normalize.'99
The sense of responsibility that some U.S. experts have is so
high that they even go out of their way and transcend the customary
patriotic barriers. Solis offers unsolicited advice to foreign interests
in their confrontation with the United States:
[i]f the Europeans obey the Helms-Burton Act, a
dangerous precedent could be set. [. . ] The
Europeans would be committing utter folly if they
neglected to oppose the Helms-Burton Act. Unless
Congress ceases to enact the type of extraterritorial
legislation that it has.., passed, the EU would find a
great deal more of its foreign and trade policies being
written in Washington rather than in Europe.20 0
199 Id. at 352-353.
200 Solis, supra note 4, at 729.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Even if it fails to accomplish its political goals and its validity
in court is never put to the test, the Helms-Burton Act has already
become a case study that will demand continued analysis in law
schools in the future. In sum, if testimony of an expert witness would
carry weight in influencing the permanent suspension of the law, it
could be very well that history would credit the U.S. legal academic
community for the demise of the Helms-Burton Act. It remains to be
seen that when a case is brought to court under the terms of the
Helms-Burton Act, if scholarly opinion (as doctrine from authorities)
would have the necessary force to influence the outcome of the
judicial decisions. Meanwhile, the outlook seems to be bleak for the
prospects of the objectives exposed by the main backers of the law.
199 Id. at 352-353.
200 Solis, supra note 4, at 729.
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